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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
J>Zaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CI_j YDE ARNOLD WELDON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST1-\_TE~IT!JNT OF TI-IE C1\_SE 
No. 8561 
This case is before this Court on appeal from a judg-
ment of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Utah, in and for Iron County, finding the 
defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit 
robbery. The case was tried before the court, a jury hav-.. 
ing been "\vaived by the defendant. 
The information 'vas filed against two defendants, 
Robert Clayton Harke and Clyde Arnold Weldon. Prior 
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2 
to trial, the court dismissed the actio __ n as against Harke, 
hence Weldon is the sole defendant in the case. 
On June 6, 1956, the County Attorney of Iron County 
filed an amended complaint before a Justice of the Peace 
charging the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery. 
After a preliminary hearing the defendant was bound 
over to the District Court, a jury was waived by the de-
fendant, the case was tried, and the trial court entered 
the judgment heretofore noted. 
The defendant introduced no evidence in his defense. 
The judgment of the trial court finding the defendant 
guilty of conspiracy to commit robber~ ... 'vas entered not-
withstanding-
(1) Prior to the introduction of any evidence the 
District Attorney prosecuting the case stated in 
open court that ''there is not a prima facie case 
against the defendant. I don't believe there is 
a prima facie case * * *" (Tr. 2). 
( 2) Prior to the introduction of any evidence he 
further stated that '' \\T e haYe no proof of the 
overt act going to the conspirac~~, no evidence 
that this defendant intended to use the item.'' 
(7 1r. 3 ). (He "~a~ referring- to a gun). 
(3) \Vht>n the State rested the District .Attorney 
stat<:d, ·'About all I \Vould care to say at this 
t:imQ i~ that in 1n~· opinion the State has failed 
in its duty to prove a prin1a. fncie case. H (Tr. 
:J.'J). 
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STATEl\IIENT OF FAGTS 
The only evidence introduced by the State was the 
testimony of Jack F. Miller, a police officer of Cedar City, 
Utah, and Exhibit "A" introduced by the State which 
purported to be a "\Vritten confession signed by the de-
fendant. 
Officer Miller testified substantially as follows: 
That on 1Iay 15th, 1956, shortly after midnight, he 
went to the Cedars Hotel in the co:mtPany of a man named 
, ) 
Robinson; that the defendant and Harke were lying on 
the same bed inside a hotel room with the door into the 
hallway wide open (Trans. 7-8); that Officer l\Iiller 
knocked on the door, and after being given permission, 
"\Valked into the room and asked the names of the men, 
vvhere they were from, "\Vhat they were doing and if they 
\Vould go to the police station. (.Tr. 8). 
They saw a gun lying on the bed beside Harke and 
\V eldon told them that his gun was in his jacket across 
the room on the back of a chair. Both guns were loaded. 
The officer took possession of the guns. ( T r. 8). 
The four men went to the Cedar City police station, 
vvhcre the officer talked ,vith \Veldon and Harke together 
and then Weldon separately. ( T r. 9). 
vVeldon made various admissions {Tr. 10-13) re-
specting a planned robbery the next morning of Safeway 
Store in Cedar City, to "\vhich testimony defendant ob-
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jected (Tr. 11-14). He signed a confession (Tr. 15 ). 
Respecting the confession (Ex. 1) the witness testified 
that the man Robinson told the defendant that he didn't 
have to sign a statement or confession and that if he did, 
it would be voluntary (Tr. 15) and that there were no 
promises held out, etc., (Tr. 16), but the -witness was not 
in the room at all times. He stated that he was noi pres-
ent in the room at the police station at the specific times 
\vhen the defendant was being questioned by Robinson 
and an Officer H9yt; that he had to leave the office to 
ans,ver two or three telephone calls, and on another oc-
(~asion was called out for a short time. (Tr. 18 ). 
STATE~IENT OF ERRORS RELIED 0~ 
For a reversal of the judgment of the trial court 
finding the defendant guilty, the defendant relies on the 
following errors of the trial court: 
1. The trial court erred in admitting the written and 
oral confession of the defendant for the follo\Y-
Ing reasons : 
(a) The corpus delicti "~as not sufficiently es-
tablished. Independent of the confession, 
there is no p~oof \YhateYer that the defend-
nut conspired to commit tht:) crime charged, 
or any cr1n1E\ 
(h) The StatP did not proYe the confession \rns 
prima fnrie voluntar~~. 
II. F~v-t•n 1 hough there had been a plan to com1nit a 
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robbery as charged in the information (but no 
plan was proved) there was no overt act in 
furtherance thereof. 
vVhile it may. seem out of order, the appellant be-
lieves it will prove-more logical to discuss the points above 
raised out of the above ord~r so. that Point I (a) will be 
argued first, Point II second, and Point I (b) last. 
ARGUMENT 
I(a) 
The trial court erred in admitting the confession of the defend-
ant because the corpus delicti was not sufficiently established. 
Independent of the confession, there is no proof whatever that 
the defendant conspired to commit any crime whatever, much 
less the crime charged in . the information. 
Let us re-examine the proof of the State, deleting 
any information supplied by defendants' confession (Ex. 
1). A police officer and another man went to a hotel 
room, the door to vvhich "\Vas wide open (Tr. 7-8). rrhey 
found t'vo men on a bed. A loaded gun 'vas on the bed. 
The defendant had a loaded gun in his jacket which was 
across the room (Tr. 8). The two men did not object to 
and voluntarily accompanied the police officer to the po-
lice ·station (Tr. 9 ). 
That is the sole independent proof of the commission 
of a crime. Defendant has comhed the record to find any 
evidence additional to the above. There is none. 
'\That crime do those facts show? vVe submit, none 
,,,~hateyer. 
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There is neither independent proof of any crime nor 
the particular crime charged. There is no independent 
evidence of any planned robbery, or any plan to rob 
Safeway Store, or any plan to rob Robert Childs, indi-
vidually or as the assistant manager of Safeway Store. 
There is not even any evidence that there was such a per-
son as Robert Child, much less that he was the assistant 
manager of Safeway Store. There is not even any eYi-
dence that there is a Safeway Store in Cedar City or Iron 
tJounty or in the State of Utah. There is absolutely no 
evidence of any overt act necessary to constitute the 
offense of conspiracy. 
It is the ordinary rule of }a,,, adhered to by ihis 
Court, that the confession of an accused person is not 
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the offense. 
This Court has held to that effect in too many cases 
to require argument. 
The doctrine enunciated by thi~ Court in State ·r. 
Johnson, 95 Utah 37~, 83 Pac. 2d 1010, nt page 101-!, has 
since been follo~red, and 'Yc quote pertinent portions: 
'' \\r e adhere to the general doctrine that there 
must be independent proof of the corpus delicti be-
fore the confession can be received for the consid-
eration of the jury * * ~,. The rule 've deduce from 
the "'"'(v· it is applied in the over"Thelming majority 
of the caRes is that there must be evidence, inde-
pPlHlent of the confesRion, eorroborative thereof, 
consistent 1 here"·ith, forming a basi~ or foundation 
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7 
for the confession, and tending to confirm and 
strengihen it, before the confession may be consid-
ered by the jury as evidence of guilt. * * * But the 
law for reasons which immediately appear has 
wisely declared that there must be independent ev-
idence of the first and second points, commonly 
called the corpus delicti.'' 
Defendant contends strenuously that there is not one 
scintilla of evidence that defendant conspired to commit 
any crime, unless lounging in a hotel room with a loaded 
gun can be considered a conspiracy to commit the crime 
of robbery. 
Follo"\\ring the ,Johnson case is that of State v. Ferry, 
~~Utah 2d 371, 275 Pac. 2c1173, 'vhcrein the Court tersely 
~aid: 
''An accused cannot be convicted on his con-
fession alone. "\Ve believe and hold that in addi-
tion there must be independent, clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the corpus delicti, although we and 
the authorities g·enerally do not require it to be con-
vincing· beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
II. 
Even though there was a plan to commit robbery as charged 
~n the information, the defendant committed no overt act. 
The defendant \vas charged under Section 76-12-1, U. 
(J . .rl., \Vhich defines criminal conspiracy (so far as per-
tinent to this case) : "If t\vo or more persons conspire ( 1) 
rr •t .· ,, 
. o comm1 n Cltme. 
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Section 76-12-8. provides as follows: 
''Act Besides .. A.greement Necessary. - No 
agreement, except to commit a felony upon the per. 
son of another or to commit arson or burglary, 
amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, besides 
such agreement, is done to effect the object thereof 
by one or more parties to such agreement.'' 
In short, there must be some qvert act where the de-
fendant is charged with COJ!Spiracy to commit robbery. 
Where is the evidence establishing that overt act~ . What 
overt act~ The closest the State came to proving an 
overt act, and we state it at the risk of being repetitious, 
was that the defendant and Harke were lounging in a hotel 
room with a loaded gun. This falls far short of proving 
even an intention to rob the assistant manag·er of Safe-
way Store, or Safe,vay Store, much less any overt act in 
furtherance. Defendant nor anyone else planning a rob-
bery made the slightest move to,vards the store. 
''Other than agreements to commit certain fel-
onies which require no oYer arts, an unlawful agree-
ment as defined in Section 103-11-1, U.C ... A .. , 1943, 
does not amount to conspiracy according to the 
specifications of Section 103-11-3, ~unless some act, 
besides sueh agreen1ent, is done to effect the object 
thereof by one or n1ore of the parties to agreement.~ 
Thus, a eri1ninal conspiracy essentially consists of 
an unla,vful agreement PljUS SO~IE OVERT ... ~CT 
OR AC~TS l)ONE TO :F,lTRTIIER OR ACUO~I­
l">LISI-I TI-IE ()l~.Jl~CTI\ ... E OF STiCH AN 
.A .. GREE~fEKT. '' Slate ~vs. J.lf.usscr, rf al .. 175 Pae. 
~nd 7:24, at. pagP 731, 110 lTtah 5:3+. 
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Sections 76-12-1 and 76-12-3, U.C.A., 1953, are identi-
cal with Sections 103-.11-1 and 103-11-3, U.C.A.. 1943. 
This rule is so overwhelmingly adopted by the Courts 
that defendant sees no purpose in citing additional auth-
ority, the above case having never been overruled. 
I (b) 
The trial court erred in admitting the confession of the defend-
ant because the State did not prima facie prove the confession 
\Vas voluntary. 
The burden of proof is on the State. The rule re-
~pecting- the voluntariness of confessions is well stated 
in State v. lV ells, 35 Utah 400, 100 Pac. 681, at page 683 : 
"\~V e are therefore of the opinion that, \vhen 
evidence of the defendant's confession is offered by 
the state, it, on the defendant's objection, must first 
introduce some evidence tending to show that the 
confession was voluntary; that it is alone "\\t~ithin 
the province of the jury to determine, not whether 
the confession was or \vas not voluntary, but wheth-
er a sufficient prima facie showing, with respect to 
its voluntariness, is made to warrant a finding that 
it is voluntary; that, before the court rules upon 
the question, the privilege should he given the de-
fendant, if he requests it, to cross-examine the \Vit-
ness, or "ritnesses, by \vhom the state seeks to sho\V 
the voluntariness of the confession; that when such 
Rhowing has been made. and the court determines 
that it is prima facie sufficient to authorize such a 
finding, then the court should admit the confes-
sion * '~ * " 
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This Court therefore holds that the State must make 
a prima facie showing that the confession is voluntary 
and then, as stated by this Court in the Wells case, ''the 
privilege should be given the defendant, if he requests it, 
to cross-examine the witness or witnesses, by whom the 
State seeks to show the voluntariness of the confession 
* * *" 
But in the case at bar, the \Yitnesses necessaTy to 
prove the voluntariness of the confession were not in 
court, and so cross-examination was unnecessary. The 
defendant did not choose to cross-examine the only wit-
ness produced because the State had not made even a 
prima facie showing to that point. It is further observed 
that the only witness produced might \Yell have been 
truthful and still the confession not haYe been voluntarily 
made because the witness "\Vas not present during the en-
tire period. This Court will reeall that the ''ritness was 
called out of the room on three. or four occasions for vary-
ing periods; for how long, the record does not disclose. 
During his absence the defendant might \Yell have been 
threatened, given false promises or inducements or \vhat-
not. The officers remaining in the roon1 "\vere not pro-
duced by the State to Inake a prima fncie sho\ving. rrney 
\Yere not nYailnble. to be eross-examined. 
Trnr, the trinl eourt attc1npted to shift the burden to 
t.he de fenf'() by saying: 
'' TrrE Counrr: 1\. t tlH) llcfendant ,s requ(_•st the rourt 
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will require that those other officers be in attend-
ance before the conclusion of the trial." (Tr. 19 ). 
•' MR. CLINE : Was the court's statement directed 
to the defendant? 
''THE CouRT: Yes. In other words, if you desire 
to question them as to any circumstances. I assu1ne 
this witness and the other officers were present 
during the qttestioning or conversation with the de-
fendant. If this witness was not present, if it is 
the desire on the part of counsel for the defendant 
to question the other 'vi tnesses either on voir dire 
-that is, as if they vvere being questioned on voir 
dire before the court adm;itted this exhibit, the court 
'viii require that they be produced." (Tr. 19 ). 
''THE CouRT: It tv as adm.itted on the assumption 
that uJe would have the testimony of a witness who 
~vas present at all times during the questioning of 
the defendant." (Tr.19). 
''THE CouRT: "That the court 'vas endeavoring to 
get at was, if there is any claim that the statements 
by the defendant were not voluntarily made, then 
the court should have all the evidence available as 
to the voluntariness of this statement, or the state-
ment, the oral statements made by the defendant 
b~fore this written statement was signed. If thet·e 
is no request for further proof on the part of the 
state, that is, to require the state to prove the vol-
untarincss of this statement or the preceding oral 
staten~ents, then the present rttling will stand. I 
think tve sh auld ha~:e the other officers present." 
(Tr. 19-20). 
The trial court assumed that the witness and. the 
other officers \\Tere present during the questioning, and 
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then indulged in the unique position that he would ass~um.e 
the oonfession was voluntary unless the defendant insist-
ed upon the State proving it. In short, the trial court 
ruled, in effect, that unless the defendant' indirectly pro-
duced the State's 'witnesses, he would assume they would 
testify favorably and prove that the confession was vol-
untary. Defendant does not believe this Court will so 
hold. 
Further, the con£ ession was admitted ''on the as-
sumption that we would have the testimony of a witness 
who was present at all times during the questioning of 
the defendant.'' We believe such an assumption unique 
in criminal practice. But even so, no such ,,rJ.tness or wit-
nesses were produced, yet the trial court itself attempted 
to supply the lack of proof by ruling that unless the de-
fendant requested the State to suppl~v the proof he would 
assume it was proved. 
As a matter of fact. too, the confession had already 
been admitted. 
Trne, the court said it 'vould require the attendance 
of the other officers ''at the defendant's request'' and 
"if you desire to question them'' and "if it is the desire 
on the part of counsel to question the other \Yitnesses," 
etr. The eourt also added that if the defendant did not 
l'Q<J1lcst thr State to mnke further proof, '·that is, to re-
quire the State to prove the Yoluntariness '' the confes-
~~ ion '''onld h(• admitted. 
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Defendant submits that it is not his duty to request 
or require. the ·state to prove its case; to demand addi-
tional witnesses to be produced by the State or the trial 
court to prove the State's case. Defendant submits that 
he does not waive any rights by not calling the State's at-
tention to its lack of proof, and that the burden of proof 
cannot be shifted because a trial court arbitrarily states 
in open court, in effect, "If you don't think the prosecu-
tion 4as proved a case, you must make your objection so 
additional proof can be submitted, and unless you do de-
mand additional proof I will hold that the proof has been 
produced.'' That is not the law and would certainly es-
tablish a unique rule or method of procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant believes that the District Attorney v;·as 
correct and commendably honest and frank in stating in 
open court that he could not prove a prima facie case and 
at the conclusion of his case further stating that ''the 
State has failed in its duty to prove a prima facie case.'' 
The attitude of this Court is well expressed, 
''Our traditional zeal in safeguarding the 
rights of an accused person would preclude convic-
tion on such an unsubstantial basis." State v. l?erry, 
2 Utah 2d 371, 275 Pac. 2d 173, at page 174. 
This case clearly qualifies itself for an order of this 
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Court reversing the judgment of the trial court with in-
structi~ns to grant defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Res,pectfully submitted; 
CLINE, wILSON & CLINE, 
Atto'rneys for Appellant. 
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